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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff Appellee, 
vs. 
JESSE VALDEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070368-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Valdez's motion to arrest judgment due to 
testimony by the arresting officer that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination? Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to grant 
motions for new trial, and this Court will not reverse the trial court absent a clear abuse of 
that discretion. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998). "However, 'legal 
determinations made by the [district] court as a basis for its denial of a new trial motion 
are reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Mitchell, 2007 UT App 216, ^ 6, 163 P.3d 737 
(quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 1 \,% 8, 994 P.2d 1237). 
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In this case, however, there was no contemporaneous objection made to the 
testimony. Accordingly, this issue should also be reviewed for plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of plain error Valdez must establish that an 
obvious and harmful error occurred. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). See also, State v. Reyes, 861 
P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993). Alternatively, to establish a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel Valdez must demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient—that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment; 
and that it was prejudicial—affected the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, U 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in the time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted 
do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good 
cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a 
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a 
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commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or ma\ enter am other order 
as maj be just and proper under the circumstances. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jesse Valdez appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth 
District Court after he was convicted by a jury of theft, a third degree felony. 
Specifically, he appeals from the denial of his motion to arrest judgment. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jesse Valdez was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District Court on 
May 26, 2005 with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-
6-404 (R. 1). He waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 29). 
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis on July 27, 2006 (R. 
88-87, 109). During its deliberation, the jury submitted the following question: ctWe 
would like to know if there was a checkout counter in the 'outlet?'" (R. 77). The trial 
court responded: "The jury must rely upon the evidence as presented at trial" (R. 78). 
After deliberating for approximately ninety minutes, the jury returned with a verdict of 
guilty (R. 79, 87, 109: 63-65). 
Valdez filed a motion to arrest judgment on September 20, 2006 (R. 103-94). 
After oral argument, Judge Davis denied the motion by written memorandum decision 
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issued on March 14. 2007 (R. 144-33). The formal order was signed on March 29, 2007 
(R. 150-49). 
On April 5. 2007 Valdez was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. The 
prison sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for 36-months, and he 
was ordered to pa> a $450.00 fine and spend 365 days at the Utah County Jail in the 
ankle monitoring program (R. 159-57, 165: 17). 
Valdez filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on May 2, 2007 (R. 181). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Joseph Otte1 is a Provo City police officer who works part time at Deseret 
Industries (DI) in plain clothes as a loss prevention officer (R. 109: 13). He has been 
employed as a police officer for four years, and has worked at DI for three years (R. 109: 
13). On May 19, 2005 he was working at DI (Id.). While he was walking through the 
store looking for suspicious activity, he had contact with Jesse Valdez (R. 109: 15, 13). 
Valdez approached him in the store and asked to borrow his personal cellular phone (R. 
109: 14). Otte could not remember if Valdez informed him who he wanted to call (R. 
109: 27). 
Otte next saw Valdez as he was "going through an end cap which held jewelry" 
(R. 109: 15). The end cap had four shelves and the jewelry was packaged in small plastic 
bags (R. 109: 15). The standard price for such jewelry was $1.00 a piece (R. 109: 29-30). 
1
 The transcript refers to Otte as "Joseph Audy." However, the trial court, defense and 
prosecution all refer to him as "Joseph Otte" so that is what will be used. 
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Valdez selected approximate!) 20 pieces of jewelry (R. 109: 16) Then he walked down 
an aisle where he further inspected the jeweln (Id.). He kept some in his right hand and 
put the rest back on a shelf (R. 109: 16). Valdez looked through more jeweln but didn't 
select any other items (R. 109: 16). He also removed a pair of sunglasses from his rear 
pants pocket and picked up a bottle of Pepsi from a shelf with his left hand before 
moving to the book area (R. 109: 17). Otte followed him (Id.). Otte lost sight of him for 
about five seconds and when he saw him again, his right hand was now open and the 
jewelry was missing, and he was still holding the Pepsi in his left hand (R 109: 17). Otte 
inspected the book aisle but couldn't locate the jewelry, so he believed Valdez had 
concealed it on his person (R. 109: 17). Otte also felt Valdez was "getting nervous and 
seemed to be noticing [his] presence" (R. 109: 17). 
Otte went to the far end of the store and observed Valdez from a distance (R. 109: 
17-18). Valdez went up and down several aisles, picked up a cart, and put some items in 
the cart (R. 109: 18). He was in the store for approximately 2.5 hours (R. 109: 18). Otte 
does not remember Valdez going to the front and using a telephone during this time but 
"it's possible he could have used the phone up there. It's possible he could have 
borrowed a cell phone from another person in the store as well" (R. 109: 32-33). 
Eventually he went to the front of the store, spoke with the door greeter, and then 
left the cart in the store (R. 109: 18). He went out the front door and passed all points of 
sale without attempting to pay for any items (R. 109: 18). He then walked westbound 
across the storefront towards Columbia Lane (R. 109: 18). Otte admitted that Valdez was 
headed in the direction of the outlet part of the DI, but testified that Valdez never told 
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him he was going to the outlet (R. 109: 19, 37). At the time of the incident, there was no 
interior connection between the main store and the outlet (R. 109: 36). 
Otte stopped him and identified himself (R. 109: 18). Valdez admitted to taking 
the items and Otte took him back to the security room at DI (R 109: 18). In the office, 
Otte had Valdez empty his pockets; and from his right pants pocket he pulled out the 
pieces of jewelry, and a cell phone and spell checker with DI price tags were in his left 
pocket (R. 109:20). 
At this point the following exchange between the prosecutor and Otte took place: 
SANT: Did you have a conversation with the defendant at this point? 
OTTE: I did have some conversation. I did read him his Miranda rights, 
which he under—he said he understood and agreed to speak with me. He did say that he 
was—he did contact a brother that was en route to Deseret Industries to speak with him 
about some of the items that he had left in the cart. 
When I—I asked him about those items. He said that his conversation with 
the door greeter was that he informed the door greeter that the items in the cart were his 
and that he was going to come back for them, and so he left the cart next to the cash 
register which is—well, so that nobody would purchase them. 
I asked him if he told the doorman about the items in his pockets, at which 
time he stated he pled the Fifth and didn't want to answer the question 
(R. 109: 21). 
Otte then followed standard protocol for retail theft cases, and called another 
officer to have Valdez transported and booked into the jail (R. 109: 21). The jewelry, cell 
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phone, and spell checker were photographed for evidentiary purposes and released back 
ioDl(R. 100:21). 
On cross-examination Otte indicated he had infonned Valdez he was under arrest 
for retail theft and had asked him if he was trying to steal the jewelr} b\ putting it in his 
pocket (R. 109: 30-31). Otte testified that in response Valdez Uwsaid that he had called his 
brother. He didn't give me a real direct yes or no" (R. 109: 31). Otte also had the 
following exchange with defense counsel: 
GALE: Your conversation with [Valdez] was fairly brief, wasn't it? 
OTTE: It was. 
GALE: And that was because at some point he told you that he could see 
that you were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't want to talk 
anymore? 
OTTE: That is correct 
(R. 109: 37-38). 
Valdez asked Otte to go outside and look for his brother, Blake (R. 109: 38). Otte 
located his brother, infonned him Jesse was being arrested, and asked him to take care of 
Jesse's bike so that it wouldn't get stolen or damaged (R. 109: 38-39). Blake informed 
Otte that he was there to look at some items and that Jesse had called him (R. 109: 39-
40). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Valdez asseits that the trial couit committed plain erroi in allowing the arresting officer 
to testifv concerning his post- Mu anda silence The error was ob\ IOUS and not harmless be\ ond 
a reasonable doubt, and the conviction in this case should be re\ersed and the judgment arrested 
Alternateely, he asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel at 
trial 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN 
ALLOWING TESTIMONY FROM THE ARRESTING OFFICER 
CONCERNING VALDEZ5 S FOST-MIRANDA SILENCE. 
ALTERNATIVELY, VALDEZ WAS DENIED COMPETENT TRIAL 
COUNSEL. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides upon motion of the 
defendant filed before imposition of sentence, a trial court shall arrest judgment "if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the defendant is mentally 
ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment." Valdez filed a timely motion 
to arrest alleging that the testimony of the arresting officer that he had invoked his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination constitutes good cause under Rule 23 
which requires arrest of judgment in this matter. Ordinarily, this issue is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard, with any legal determinations reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998), and State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, 
f 8, 994 P.2d 1237. 
There was no contemporaneous objection to the testimony. However, this Court 
should still review this issue for plain error, and alternatively for ineffective assistance of 
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counsel To prevail on a claim of plain error Valdez must establish that an obvious and 
harmful error occurred. State v Menzies. 889 P.2d 393. 403 (Utah 1994) (citing State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201. 1208 (Utah 1993)). See also. State v Reyes.. 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 
(Utah App 1993). Alternative!}. to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
Valdez must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient—that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment: and that it was prejudicial— 
affected the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, j^ 19, 12 P.3d 92 
(citations omitted). 
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error which Necessitates Arrest of Judgment 
in this Matter 
Valdez asserts that the trial court committed plain error in allowing testimony 
from the arresting officer concerning Valdez's post-Miranda silence because it violated 
his constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. To establish plain error. Valdez must 
show: (1) an error exists; (2) which should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) 
the error was harmful or there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
absent the error. State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1997). See also, State 
v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997). In addition, because the error arises 
out of an alleged constitutional violation, the State has the burden of demonstrating that 
the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d at 
1296, 1298 (harmless beyond reasonable doubt standard utilized under plain error 
standard of review). See also, State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269 n.4; Greer v. Miller, 483 
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U.S. 756. 765-67, 107 S.Ct. 3102. 3108-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987); and Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630. 113 S.Ct. 1710. 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d353 (1993) {Doyle 
violations are subject to harmless beyond reasonable doubt standard). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the prosecution from using a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence for impeachment purposes. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 
2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Such use of a defendant's silence is a prejudicial attempt 
to create an improper inference of guilt in the jury's mind. See United States v. Newman, 
943 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991), and State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App. 
1997). "'Similarly, the prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 534 (citations omitted). "In evaluating 
whether the disclosure of a defendant's exercise of Miranda rights is a Doyle violation, a 
court must look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the context of the 
disclosure." Statev.Maas, 1999 UT App 325,^21, 991 P.2d 1108. 
The trial court's ruling, a copy of which is included in the Addenda, suggests that 
there was no error—obvious or otherwise—in this case because the holding of Doyle 
only applies to situations where a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent is used 
for impeachment purposes (R. 137). See also, Greer, 483 U.S. at 763, 107 S.Ct. at 3107. 
More specifically the trial court suggested that there is no violation here where "an 
officer merely testifies about 'the circumstances of the arrest and... the information 
elicited was but a part of the natural sequence of events.' State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 
1328 (Utah 1980)" (R. 137). Valdez asserts that this analysis is erroneous. 
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The factual scenario in Unas is distincth eh different than is present here. The 
questioning in Unas was general and dealt onh with the circumstances of the arrest: "Q. 
After \ ou read him the statement of his rights, did \ ou ask if he understood them? A. 
Yes, Sir. Q. And what was his answer? A. He exercised his rights and wanted to 
contact an attorne} before he made am statement. Q. Did he thereafter discuss this 
matter with you at that time? A. No. Sir. I called his attorne}.'* 609 P.2d at 1328. The 
trial court, sua sponte. struck "I called his attorney" and instructed the jur\ it was to be 
disregarded. Id. There was nothing in the testimom which could "cast any inference of 
guilt" or "persuade the jury to do so." Id 
Similarly, the trial court's reliance on State v Harmon. 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998), 
and State v. Maas. 1999 UT App 325. 991 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1999), is also misplaced. In 
Harmon, "defendant's invocation of rights was disclosed incidentally in testimony as 
defendant read a portion of an officer's report intended to refresh [his] recollection of 
events." Maas, 1999 UT 325 at ^ 22 (citing Harmon, 956 P.2d at 266). Defense counsel 
objected but refused the offered curative instruction. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 267. In 
concluding there was no Doyle violation, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
disclosure was inadvertent and didn't cast an inference as to defendant's guilt. Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 269. 
In Maas, the testimony by the officer at issue was as follows: Q. "What was the 
nature of your conversation with Ms. Maas?" A. ".... I explained to Ms. Maas all the 
evidence I had acquired up to that time. At that time I advised Karen of her rights, read 
her a waiver, asked her if she wanted to talk to me. She responded 'Why, you have 
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everything anywa\ ? No, I don't v ant to talk to you/'" 1999 UT App 325 at n. 1. This 
Court concluded that the testimony was inadvertent and "not significant enough on its 
own to violate Doyle T 1999 UT App 325 at ^ 24. In addition, there was "no attempt to 
cast the forbidden inference that Maas's silence equaled guilt. Id. at j^ 25. "When an 
officer simpl)/ testifies about the circumstances surrounding an interview, a part of which 
is defendant's silence, without using defendant's silence to impeach her credibility, there 
is no violation of the Doyle principle." Id 
In this case—unlike Unas, Harmon, and Maas, the nature of Otte's testimony 
itself casts forbidden inferences on Valdez's guilt. The pertinent exchange between the 
prosecutor and Otte is as follows: 
Q.: Did you have a conversation with the defendant at this point? 
A.: I did have some conversation. I did read him his Miranda rights, which he 
under—he said he understood and agreed to speak with me. He did say that he was—he 
did contact a brother that was en route to Deseret Industries to speak with him about 
some of the items that he had left in the cart. 
When I—I asked him about those items. He said that his conversation with 
the door greeter was that he informed the door greeter that the items in the cart were his 
and that he was going to come back for them, and so he left the cart next to the cash 
register which is—well, so that nobody would purchase them. 
I asked him if he told the doorman about the items in his pockets, at which 
time he stated he pled the Fifth and didn't want to answer the question 
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(R. 109: 21). The vers nature of this dialogue—that Valdez was cooperative and had an 
explanation ior items he^d left in a cart, hut that he \\ ouldn't talk about the items in his 
pocket instead pleading "the Fifth"—uses his silence to impeach his credibility and 
creates an inference of guilt. Accordingly, Valdez asserts that the constitutional 
protections afforded him b\ the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Doyle were 
violated by the testimony, and any suggestion by the trial court to the contrary is in error. 
In State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1993), this Court based on prior Utah 
appellate decisions and Doyle, concluded that it was obvious error for the trial court to 
allovs the State to elicit testimony concerning a defendant's post-custody silence. 861 
P.2d at 1057, n. 2. See also, State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296. In Reyes, one of the 
participating officers testified that after the defendant was taken into custody, he was 
advised of his Miranda rights. He was also asked to waive those rights and speak to 
officers without the presence of an attorney. The Officer then testified that the defendant 
"stated he wanted to have his attorney present to talk to us." No objection to the 
testimony was made by trial counsel, and this Court utilized the plain error standard of 
review. 861 P.2d at 1056-57. 
In Morrison, the arresting officer testified that the defendant seemed willing to 
speak with him after Miranda warnings were administered until a co-defendant twice told 
him to shut up. 937 P.2d at 1295. The prosecutor also questioned the co-defendant, who 
testified that at the time she had her lawyer on the telephone and he advised her to remain 
silent and for the defendant to do the same. So she told the defendant to shut up. 936 
P.2d at 1296. Again there were no objections to the questioning by defense counsel and 
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the case was argued under the plain error standard. 937 P.2d at 1295, 1296. In relation to 
the first two prongs of that standard this Court, citing to Doyle and Reyes, held, "It is 
error of a nature of that should be obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor \ iolates 
the well-established general rule prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a 
defendant's post-Miranda silence." 937 P.2d at 1296. Valdez asserts that under Reyes 
and Morrison, the first two prongs for establishing plain error have therefore been 
satisfied. 
In regards to the third prong—whether the State's reference to Valdez's post-arrest 
silence prejudiced him, the utState bears the burden of demonstrating that the improperly 
elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296 
(citation omitted). "'In evaluating whether an evidentiary issue was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, [this Court] focus[es] on 'whether there is a reasonable probability that 
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction/" Id. (quoting 
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). In 
analyzing such prejudice, this Court has utilized the following four factors from Reyes: 
"'(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as 
referring to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and (4) whether the trial court 
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's [silence].'" 
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057). 
See also, State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 554-55 (Utah 1987). Valdez asserts that after 
balancing these factors this Court should conclude like it did in Reyes and Morrison, that 
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the elicited testimony which direct!} referenced his constitutional!} guaranteed right to 
remain silent, constituted plain constitutional erroi thai is not harmless be\ond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The first factor is "whether the jun \^ould "naiuralh and necessarih construe* the 
comment as referring to defendant's silence.'* Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. The trial court 
and the State concede that taW[t]here is little question that with regard to the first factor, the 
jury in this case 'would naturally and necessarily construe* the comment as referring to 
the defendant's silence" (R. 117, 136). 
The second factor is wCwhether there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's 
guilt." Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. The trial court concluded that the evidence against 
Valdez was "overwhelming'*: fc'[B]y the time the defendant walked past the cash 
registers, he had already committed theft. No reasonable person puts a cell phone in a 
leather case, a spell checker and assorted jewelry in a separate pant's pocket prior to 
purchase and then leaves a store without any payment or attempted payment for any 
items" (R. 135). 
Valdez asserts, however, that the trial court's conclusion is overly simplistic and 
does not take into account several other important factors which the jury was privy to, or 
which this Court has relied upon in other cases. For example, in Reyes, one factor which 
this Court found that weighed in favor of reversal was that testimony that the defendant 
refused to talk with police could be seen as inconsistent with his defense theory that the 
evidence was planted to frame him. Id Valdez asserts that factor is also present here. 
His invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent—his refusal to talk with 
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Officer Otte about the items in his pocket—is inconsistent with his theory of the case that 
he was going from the main part of the store to the outlet to continue shopping while 
waiting for his brother, and that he had not left the store property nor had he moved 
towards his bicycle. 
While it is true that the items were located in his pockets, Valdez's theory of the 
case was that he had items in his hands and was using his pockets to secure and hold the 
items in question while he continued to shop while waiting for his brother. Interestingly 
enough, the jury submitted a question to the trial court, which read: "We would like to 
know if there was a checkout counter in the 'outlet?'" (R. 77). Valdez asserts that 
question demonstrates they were strongly considering his theory of the case and that 
evidence of his guilt was not nearly as overwhelming as the trial court concluded, 
particularly in light of the fact that at the time of the incident there was no inside access 
between the main part of the store and the outlet, and that Valdez's brother did arrive and 
corroborate his story. See Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297-98 (Defendant found in same 
room as contraband and claimed that items were under control of co-defendant. 
Exculpatory explanation was plausible and case turned on defendant's credibility, 
accordingly appellate court was "not convinced" that evidence of guilt was 
overwhelming). 
The third factor is "whether the reference was isolated." Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. 
The trial court concluded that "it is difficult to imagine a more isolated reference than one 
solitary comment by the officer as part of a long narration" (R. 135). Again Valdez 
asserts that the trial court's conclusion does not give adequate consideration to 
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circumstances and e\ents surrounding the testimon}. For example, inquiries into a 
defendant's silence "lake on greater significance" in light of a trial lasting onh one da\. 
Velarde v. Shulsen 757 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1985). relied on b\ this Court in Byr± 
937 P.2d at 536. In this case, the presentation of evidence took onh two hours and 
Officer Otte was the onl} witness. Under these circumstances. Yaldez asserts that like in 
Byrd. "Both the short length of the trial and the timing of the prosecutor's references tend 
to weigh against the State on this factor." 937 P.2d at 536-37. Similarly in Morrison, 
this Court concluded that two references during two witnesses testimonies were not 
isolated in "the course of a trial which lasted only one and one-half days." 937 P.2d at 
1297. 
Moreover, in Reyes, this Court seemingly linked the third and fourth factors 
together in its balancing: uAlthough the elicited comment was isolated and was not 
referred to in closing argument, the trial court did not immediately admonish the jury to 
disregard it. Instead, the trial court's curative efforts were limited to a jury instruction 
given at the close of trial." 861 P.2d at 1057. The fourth factor is ''whether the trial court 
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's [silence].'9 
Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535. In this case, like Reyes and Morrison, there was no curative 
instruction given to the jury regarding the improper testimony or defendant's right to 
remain silent. Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297. In addition, like 
Reyes, the trial court's curative efforts here were limited to an instruction given to the 
jury at the close of trial, which went solely to defendant's decision not to testify and did 
not include his right to remain silent during pre-trial investigation. 861 P.2d at 1057. See 
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Jun Instruction 18 in the Addenda. Accordingly. Valdez asserts that the fourth factor 
likewise leads this Court to a conclusion that the testimony as to his invocation of his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The trial court's ruling suggests that the invited error doctrine might or should 
have application here because on cross-examination—after Otte's testimony that Valdez 
had "pled the Fifth"—defense counsel had the following exchange with Officer Otte: 
Q.: Your conversation with [Valdez] was fairly brief, wasn't it? 
A.: It was. 
Q: And that was because at some point he told you that he could see that you 
were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't want to talk 
anymore? 
A.: That is correct 
(R. 109: 37-38). However, Valdez asserts that the invited error doctrine is not applicable 
here. One, because Otte's original testimony alone constituted a Doyle violation that was 
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Valdez nor his counsel had nothing to do 
with the elicitation of that testimony. Two, because the trial court still made no attempt 
to cure either Otte's original statement or defense counsel's exchange with Otte on cross-
examination. 
The invited error doctrine provides that "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage 
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the 
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Two 
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principal purposes are sened b\ this doctrine: One. it fortifies "long-established policy 
thai the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." Id. 
(citations omitted). Two, "it discourages parties from intentional!} misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id State v Argue lies, 
2003 UT L j^ 56 n. 13. 63 P.3d 731 (failure of trial counsel to object to adequacy of 
evaluations at competency hearing not treated as invited error but reviewed under plain 
error doctrine). There was nothing in Valdez* s acts that could have misled the trial court 
at the time Otte first testified as to his post-Miranda choice to remain silent. Second, if 
the error is invited here it similarly would have been invited in both Reyes and Morrison 
where there were no objections to the challenged testimony by defendant. 
Accordingly, Valdez requests that this Court conclude that a Doyle violation did, 
in fact, occur during trial, that it constituted obvious error on the part of the trial court, 
and that it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Trial Counsel was Ineffective in Failing to Object to the Testimony and in 
Further Exacerbating the Error 
Alternatively, Valdez asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to 
object to the testimony concerning his post-Miranda silence. Valdez must demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient—that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and that it was prejudicial—affected the outcome of 
the case. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at % 19 (citations omitted). 
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Because the error in allowing the testimony should have been ob\ ious to the trial 
court under Doyle, Reyes and other Utah and federal cases, it similar!) should ha\ e been 
obvious to trial counsel. Yet no objection was made nor was there am request for a 
curative instruction. Trial counsel acknowledged his "mistake" during oral arguments on 
the motion to arrest judgment (R. 166 at 2). Valdez asserts that it is clear from his 
statements that at the time of trial, he simply was unaware or had forgot about the 
prohibition against using a defendant's post-Miranda decision to remain silent for 
impeachment purposes. Accordingly, Valdez asserts that the first prong for establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel has been satisfied. 
Valdez similarly asserts that because the error was harmful under a plain error 
standard in regards to the trial court, trial counsel's failure deficient performance in this 
regard similarly prejudiced him. 
Moreover, if this Court were to conclude that the invited error doctrine is 
applicable here, Valdez asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in leading the trial court 
into error. "If counsel's failure in leading the court into error falls below the standard of 
reasonable professional practice, we may find that counsel was ineffective." Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1220 (citations omitted). Trial counsel—like the prosecution and the trial 
court—should have known that it was a constitutional violation to allow or elicit 
testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes or to create 
an inference of guilt. If trial counsel's exchange with Officer Otte leads this Court to 
conclude that there was no reversible error due to counsel's invited error, or failure by 
counsel to object to the original testimony or to request any curative instruction, Valdez 
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asserts that counsel was ineffecth e and that he was prejudiced b\ the deficient 
performance. Counsel himself acknowledged he made a "mistake" in regards to the 
underh ing testimon) at issue here, and in failing to object or request a curative 
instruction. It is clean therefore, that there was no trial strateg} at pla\ here, rather there 
was simph a deficiency. 
Accordingly. Valdez alternatively asserts that trial court was ineffective in regards 
to his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and Dovle, and that as established above he was prejudiced as a result. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Valdez requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case to the 
Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April, 2008. 
^L 
Margaret P/Gndsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
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fargaret W. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V o . 
JESSE VALDEZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Case No. 051402096 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendant, Jesse Valdez, through counsel, Richard Gale, and pursuant to Rule 23 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and based upon the accompanying 
Memorandum and Affidavit, hereby moves the Court for an Order arresting judgment and 
granting a new trial. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the 
defendant is mentally ill, of there is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of 
acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a 
commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter 
any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances. 
Defendant hereby asserts that there is good cause for Judgment to be arrested 
because error was committed at defendant's trial. This error deprived defendant of his 
right to due process of law, right to trial by an impartial jury, and right to remain silent in 
- - •• .• -. o 
* UuUxUo 
violation of the Fifth and Sixth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
1 sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 26, 2006, a jury trial was conducted in which the jury was asked to 
determine whether Jesse Valdez was guilty of Retail Theft with prior convictions, a third 
degree felony. The witnesses testified to the following facts at trial: 
1. Officer Joseph Otte (Otte) of the Provo Police Department testified that On May 
19, 2005, he was working privately as a loss prevention officer for Deseret Industries (DI) 
in Provo, Utah. While working he observed the defendant, Jesse Valdez (Valdez) acting 
in what Otte termed as a ^suspicious" manner. 
2. Otte continued to observe Valdez for approximately two and one-half hours as 
Valdez shopped in the store. At one point he saw Valdez holding a handful of $1.00 
jewelry items. After losing sight of Valdez for a short period of time, Otte noticed that 
Valdez was no longer holding the items in his hand. Otte could not locate the items 
Valdez had been holding in the store and suspected that Valdez had hidden the items on 
his person. 
3. The Deseret Industries building was composed of two sections, to the east the main 
store and to the west the outlet store. Between the two sections of the store was an 
employee only section which could not be accessed by the public. Each section of the 
store had to be entered from the exterior of the building. 
4. After Otte watched Valdez for some time, he observed Valdez approach the front 
of the store pushing a cart that held some remote control cars. Valdez had a brief 
Ouu 
com eisation w ith the DI gieetei left the cart neai the front of the store b\ the cashieis 
and exited the stoie without paying foi am items 
5 Otte testified that upon exiting the building Valdez headed w est in the general 
direction of the outlet store Valdez "s bicycle \\ as left at the bicycle rack w Inch w as to 
the east near the enhance to the mam stoie 
6. Otte testified that he stopped Valdez appioximatel} 15 feet from the entrance to 
the outlet store After stopping Valdez. Otte informed Valdez that he was a loss 
prevention officer and that he was stopping him because he believed Valdez had 
concealed some jewelry on his person 
7 Valdez admitted to having the jewelry in his pocket and followed Otte back to the 
mam store. 
8. In the secunty room, Otte questioned Valdez When Otte asked Valdez why he 
had left the store without paying for the items, Valdez stated that he had called his bi other 
so they could look at some items that he had m his cart Otte testified that he latei went 
outside and found Valdez"s brother had arrived Valdezs brother verified that Valdez had 
called him so the> could look at some items and determine whethei or not they should 
purchase the items Otte testified that Valdez also stated that he had informed the 
doorman at DI about his intent to come back for the items in the cart. Otte asked Valdez 
if he informed the doorman that he had items in his pocket, at which time Valdez stated 
that he pleaded the fifth and did not want to answer the question. 
9. Otte then read Valdez his Miranda rights and asked him to fill out a written 
statement. Valdez stated he did not want to fill out a written statement. 
DUuxuI 
10. At trial, when questioned by the State on direct examination, Otte testified in front 
of the jury that Valdez plead the fifth when he asked Valdez if he told the greeter about 
the items in his pocket. Valdez's attorney did not object. No curative instruction or jury 
instruction was given to remedy the error. 
11. On July 26, 2006, the jury found Valdez guilty of Retail Theft with prior 
convictions, a third degree felony. 
12. Following the Jury trial, Jennifer Ranson, a law student working with defendant's 
attorney, spoke with one of jurors about their reason for convicting Valdez. The juror 
stated that two of the jurors believed there was reasonable doubt in the case, but were 
persuaded to convict Valdez because they thought if he had been innocent he would have 
protested more, rather than quietly going away to jail. (Affidavit of Jennifer Ranson) 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that u4the court may, 
upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the 
rights of a party." 
The United States Supreme Court has held that, under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). The 
prosecution's use of post-Miranda silence "prejudices the defendant by attempting to 
create an inference of guilt in the jury's mind." United States v. Newman. 943 F.2d 1155, 
1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 
U U u ^  t J 
ALLOWING OTTE TO TESTIFY THAT YALBEZ INVOKED HIS FIFTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT WAS PLAIN ERROR 
In the present case. Officer Otte's testimom that Valdez ''pleaded the fifth'"' 
created an inference of guilt in the jury's mind. By eliciting the testimony from the 
State's main witness that Yaldez had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence the 
defendant was prejudiced. Allowing this testimony in contravention of a well-
established rule was plain error 
A similar circumstance occurred In State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 
1997). In Morrison police officers executed an arrest warrant on Morrison. After sendee 
of the arrest warrant, officers searched the room where they had found Morrison and 
uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded gun. At trial, the prosecution elicited 
testimony from two witnesses regarding Morrison's choice to remain silent after being 
arrested and receiving his Miranda warning. Defense counsel did not object to either line 
of questioning. Id. at 1295-1296. 
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court committed plain error by 
not sua sponte intervening when the prosecutor elicited testimony that improperly 
referred to Morrison's choice to remain silent after being arrested and after the Miranda 
warnings had been administered. LI at 1296. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is error of a nature that should be 
obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the well-established general rule 
prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda silence. 
DOuuaS 
(citations omitted). Thus it was plain error for the prosecutor in this case to elicit 
testimony from both [witnesses] regarding Morrison's decision to remain silent.** IdL 
THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS BECAUSE VALDEZ WAS 
PREJUDICED BT THE ERROR 
In Morrison after finding that the court committed plain error, the Court of 
Appeals considered whether the error was harmless. The court stated, *w[t]o establish that 
this error did not prejudice defendant, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, (citations 
omitted). In evaluating whether an evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we focus on 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.* (citations omitted)." Id. 
The Morrison court used the following four factors established in State v. Reyes, 
861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993), in its analysis of the harm the defendant suffered: 
"(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring 
to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's 
guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; (4) whether the trial court instructed the jury 
not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify." Id. at 
1297. 
The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Morrison. Valdez invoked 
his constitutional Fifth Amendment rights at the time he was detained and taken into 
custody by Otte at Deseret Industries. At trial the prosecution questioned Otte regarding 
Valdez's invoking of his constitutional right to remain silent. 
no 
As in Morrison, to correctly analyze the harm Valdez suffered by the prosecution's 
action and the trial court's inaction, the four factors established in Reyes must be utilized. 
A. The Jury Naturally and Neccesarily Construed the Comment as 
Referring to Yaldez's Silence 
The first Reyes factor asks whether the jury would naturally and necessarily 
construe the comment as referring to defendant's silence. There is no question that in this 
case the jury would construe the testimony as referring to the defendant's silence. At 
trial, the security guard testified that "Valdez stated that he pleaded the fifth and did not 
want to answer the question.'' This statement clearly refers to Valdez's silence. 
Further, as the attached affidavit shows, after the trial one of the jurors admitted 
that knowing about Valdez's silence affected the jury's decision to find him guilty. 
B. There Was Not Overwhelming Evidence of Valdez's Guilt 
The second Reyes factor considers the evidence of defendant's guilt. In order to 
show harm the evidence must be overwhelming. In this case, the evidence was not 
overwhelming. 
The testimony at trial showed the following facts: 
1. Valdez spent over two hours shopping; 
2. The items in his pocket were small and could easily have fallen through the 
shopping cart; 
3. Valdez called his brother meet him at the store 
4. Valdez had not left the store property and was actually stopped close to the 
entrance to the outlet store. 
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5. Valdez told Otte that he was waiting for his brother to bring him money 
6. Valdez told the DI greeter he would be back to purchase the items in the 
cart 
7. Valdez left his bike near the entrance to the main store 
8. Valdez's brother actually arrived and stated that Valdez had called him to 
come and look at the items to determine whether they should purchase the 
items Valdez was accused of stealing. 
Certainly this evidence is sufficient for the court to conclude that evidence of 
Valdez's guilt was not overwhelming. 
C. The Reference to Valdez Invoking his Right to Remain Silent 
was Not an Isolated Incident 
The third Reyes factor is whether the reference to Valdez's invoking of his right to 
remain silent was an isolated incident. In Morrison, the court held that two references to 
the defendant's silence in a 1-1/2 day trial prejudiced the defendant. In the present case, 
the prosecutor referred to Valdez's invocation of his right to remain silence during direct 
examination of the loss prevention officer. Although there was a single reference, the 
reference came from the prosecution's only witness. Furthermore, the trial was a one day 
trial, the presentation of evidence lasted less than two hours. It was during this short 
presentation that the reference was made. Although there were two references in 
Morrison, more evidence was presented in that trial, therefore a single reference in this 
short trial from the state's only witness, was not an isolated incident. 
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D. The Court Did Not Give the Jury Arn Curative Instructions 
The fourth factor deals with the trial courts instructions to the jury not to draw any 
adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify. In the present case. 
Defendant's counsel did not request and curative instructions and the court did not give 
an\ curative instructions sua sponte. Jury Instruction #18. instructed the jury that they 
could not hold Valdez's decision not to testify against him. However, the court did not 
give a curative instruction to the jury regarding their duty to not indulge in any adverse 
presumption or inference because of post arrest silence. 
CONCLUSION 
It was error for the Otte to testify that Valdez invoked his fifth amendment right to 
remain silent. Although defendant's attorney did not object, this was a plain error 
because it violated the well-established rule prohibiting the state from eliciting testimony 
of a defendant's invocation of his fifth amendment right to remain silent. After 
considering the Reyes factors as outlined in State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App. 
1997), the state cannot show that this improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This constitutes good cause as contemplated by Rule 23 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, judgment should be arrested and Jesse Valdez 
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should be granted a new trial. ' * 
: <Y I, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this h day of Septembef, 2006 / 
/ 
• " ' 
RICHARD P. GALE 
Attorney for Defendant 
U U U U J •J 
GENERAL 4FFID4VIT 
State of Utah 
Count} of Utah 
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary, Ste\ en E \\ erett, on this 1 lth day of September, 
2006, personally appealed Jennifei Ranson, known to me to be a credible person and of lawful 
age, who being by me fust duly sworn, on hei oath, deposes and says 
On the day of Jesse Valdez's trial, I, Jennifei Ranson, was an extern with the Utah 
County Public Defender office I had accompanied my supervisor, Mr Richaid Gale, to the 
courthouse, m older to obsen e Mi Valdez's trial Following the verdict and the close of the 
trial, I w as discussing the case w ith Mr Gale, m the courthouse parking lot As I walked to my 
cai, my path crossed that of one of the jurors who had decided Mr Valdez's case The juror was 
a young man, dressed m jeans and a black button-up shirt 1 gieeted him and asked him what he 
thought about the expenence He responded that it was a heavy burden to have the responsibility 
to make decisions that have a serious effect on anothei person's life 
At that point, Mi Gale approached and asked the juroi what had convinced him of Mr 
Valdez's guilt, what had made up his mind To this, the juror replied that he thought we had 
made a good argument and that "there had been two of us that weie holdouts" but they had 
finally been convinced when they decided that a reasonable peison would have protested for 
their innocence more than our defendant did He said that rather than just pleading the Fifth, an 
innocent person would not have gone quietly but would have aigued and tried to show his 
innocence Mr Gale then thanked the juior for his time and service and we all went our different 
ways 
Jennifer Ranson 
579 N 800 W, Provo UT, 84601 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 11th day of September , 2006 
[signature of Notary] 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission expires. January 1, 2010. 
STEVEN E. AVERETl 
KOiwrmic-swEtivw 
1665 NORTH 1650 WEST 
MAPLETON, UT 84664 
COMM. EXPIRES 01-01-2010 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNT\, ST4TE Of UT4H 
STATE OF UT\H 
vs 
JESSE > 4LDEZ, 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
CASE NO 051402096 
DATE MARCH 14 2007 
JUDGE m\TN \\ DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on January 25 2007 Each side w as lepresented b> 
counsel and the defendant was piesent Aftei entertaining aigument, the court took the matter 
under ad\isement 
The Court haung carefully considered the diguments of counsel and the \anous 
memoianda m the file, heieb> mles as follow s 
I 
Procedural Histor> 
1 Defendant, Jesse Valdez, was charged in a criminal information of Theft, a third degree 
felony, relating to an incident date of May 19, 2005 
2 A jury trial was conducted on July 27, 2006 The defendant was present and represented 
by Richard Gale, a Utah County Public Defender The State of Utah was represented by 
Jason Sant, Deputy Utah County Attorney 
3 The jury returned a verdict of guilty 
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4 The matter was set for sentencing on Septembei 6, 2006 The defendant failed to appear 
foi sentencing and a no bail warrant issued toi his an est He then appeared late and the 
warrant was lecalled 
5 Defendant, b> and thiough counsel filed a ''Motion to Arrest Judgment" on September 
20, 2006 
6 The State of Utah filed "State's Motion to Enlarge Time to Respond to Defendant's 
Motion to Arrest Judgment" on October 13, 2006, and subsequently filed "State's 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment" on November 29, 2006. 
7 Oral Arguments were conducted on or about January 25, 2007. 
II 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
On July 26, 2006, a jury trial was conducted m which the jury was asked to determine 
whether Jesse Valdez was guilty of Retail Theft with prior convictions, a third degree felony. The 
witnesses testified to the following facts at trial 
1. Officer Joseph Otte (Otte) of the Provo Police Department testified that on May 19, 2005, 
he was working privately as a loss prevention officer for Deseret Industries (DI) in Provo, 
Utah. While working he observed the defendant, Jesse Valdez (Valdez) acting in what 
Otte termed as a "suspicious" manner. 
2. Otte continued to observe Valdez for approximately two and one-half hours as Valdez 
shopped in the store. At one point he saw Valdez holding a handful of jewelry items. 
After losing sight of Valdez for a short period of time, Otte noticed that Valdez was no 
longer holding the items in his hand. Otte could not locate the items Valdez had been 
holding in the store and suspected that Valdez had hidden the items on his person. 
3. After Otte watched Valdez for some time, he observed Valdez approach the front of the 
store pushing a cart that held some items. Valdez had a brief conversation with the DI 
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gieetei. left the cart neai the front of the stoie and passed b) all cashiers and exited the 
stoie without paying foi, 01 attempting to pa\ foi, am items 
4 Otte testified that he stopped Valdez outside of the stoie \fter stopping Valdez, Otte 
informed Valdez that he was a loss prevention officei and that he w as stopping him 
because he behe\ed Valdez had concealed some jew elry on his person Officei Otte 
testified that "(Valdez) admitted to taking the items, and then 1 took him into the security 
loom at Deseret Industries '" 
5. Officei Otte testified furthei "Once m the security office I asked him to empty the 
contents of his pockets Fiom his right pant pocket he pulled out the pieces of jewelry 
There were nine pieces of jewelry all together From his left pocket he pulled out a Nokia 
cell phone that was in a leather case and a spell checker, both of which had Deseret 
Industries price tags on them " 
6. Officer Otte read Mr Valdez his Miranda rights which he (Valdez) said he understood 
and Valdez agreed to speak with Officer Otte. 
7. In the security room, Otte questioned Valdez When Otte asked Valdez why he had left 
the store without paying for the items, Valdez stated that he had called his brother so they 
could look at some items that he had m his cart, not on his person Otte testified that he 
later went outside and found that Valdez's brother had arrived Valdez's brother verified 
that Valdez had called him so they could look at some items and determine whethei or 
not they should purchase the items. Otte testified that Valdez also stated that he had 
informed the doorman at DI about his intent to come back for the items m the cart. Otte 
asked Valdez if he informed the doorman that he had items in the pocket, at which time 
Valdez stated that he pleaded the fifth and did not want to answer the question. 
8. Valdez's attorney did not object. No curative instruction was requested and no specific 
jury instruction was given to remedy the alleged error. 
9. Upon cross examination, defense counsel asked a question referring to this exact 
exchange. 
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Q 'And that w as because at some point he told \ou that he could see that you 
were - - suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't w ant to talk 
anymore7,' 
A "That is conect" 
(Ti ansa ipt at 3 7-38 emphasis added) 
10 Except as noted above, no other reference to Mnanda oi the defendant's silence was 
made in eithei testimony or argument during the lemamder of the trial 
11 On July 26, 2006, the jury found Valdez guilty of Retail Theft with pnor convictions, a 
thud degree felony 
III 
Law and Analysis 
Defendant, Jesse Valdez, through counsel, Richaid Gale, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Proceduie has moved the Court foi an Order arresting judgment and 
granting a new trial 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Ciimmal Procedure states 
At anytime prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon arresting judgment the 
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or 
jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew or 
retned, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
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The defendant asseits that there ^ good cause foi Judgment to be anested because en or 
\\ as committed at defendant's trial Dctendant asseits furthei that this light to due process of law, 
right to tnal b\ an impartial ju^ and right to leniain silent m \iolation of the Fifth and Sixth 
amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 sections 7, 10 and 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah 
The United States Supreme Court has held that under the Due Piocess Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the piosecution ma} not use a defendant's post-Miranda silence for 
impeachment puqioses See Do\le v Ohio, 426 U S 610, 619 (1976) The piosecution's use of 
post-Miranda silence apiejudices the defendant by attempting to create an mfeience of guilt m 
the jury's mind " United States i Newman, 943 F 2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir 1991) 
This Court, m the legal analysis, will rely almost exclusive!} upon the buefmg of the 
State of Utah because it reaches the onl> legally sustainable lesult 
First Defendant has invoked Article I sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of Utah, 
yet his brief does not reference the Utah Constitution oi make any independent aiguments 
Accoidmgl} the Court lejects independent state constitution grounds because of the absence of 
an) briefing 
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Cnminal Pioceduie provides that m ordei foi a defendant 
to pievail on a motion foi a nevv tnal, he must how an "error oi impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the lights of a party " In the instant case the defendant argues that 
Officei Otte's solitary leference at trial to the defendant's post-Miranda invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment nghts constitutes a violation of due process as outlined by the U S Supreme Court 
in Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610, 619 (1976) and that this solitary reference "had a substantial 
adverse effect" upon his nghts The Court notes that no pre-emptive, pre-trial motion (motion in 
limine) had been filed and the Court was never alerted to the fact that there might be any 
problematic testimony 
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In support of his motion, the defendant relies almost exclusively on two items an 
affidavit of a law cleik leporting a post trial com eisation the defendant's attorne\ had with a 
juror, and the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v Morrison, 937 P 2d 1293 (Utah App 
1997) 
First the Court will addiess the admission of a clerk's affidavit 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) states 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
as to any matter oi statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith . . . 
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a 
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for 
these purposes 
Similarly, in a civil case, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]it is well settled that the only 
evidence admissible to impeach a jury verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was 
determined by chance or resulted from bnbery." Groen v Tn-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). In fact, the Groen Court stated that because the jurors' affidavits "make no 
statement that the verdict or any juror's assent to it was obtained by chance or induced by bribery 
. . . [t]he affidavits were therefor inadmissible and incompetent as a basis on which to grant a 
motion for a new trial. Id. (citation omitted). 
And in a case which predated Evidence Rule 606 and was in part the reason for the 
existence of Rule 606, State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972), the defendant asserted that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury discussed his 
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failure to testify and considered that as a lactoi m arriving at its \ eidict The defendant called as a 
w itness one of the juiors who testified that wtshe would not ha\ e concuiTed in the \ erdict, had the 
discussion of defendant's failure to take the stand not been a significant part of the 
deliberations " Gee at 663 In response, the Utah Supieme Court stated 
In a long line of decisions m this jurisdiction, the principle has been firmly established 
that evidence b> affidavit 01 testimony of a juroi will not be received to impeach or 
question the jury verdict 01 to show the giounds upon which it was rendered, or to show 
then misunderstanding of fact or law, 01 that the misunderstood the chaige of the court, or 
the effect of then veidict, 01 then opinions, surmises and piocesses of reasoning in 
arriving at a verdict. (Citations omitted ) 
And m State v Lucero, 886 P.2d 1 (Utah App 1993), the defendant submitted an affidavit of a 
juroi to support his claim that one of the jury instructions improperly influenced the jury and the 
jury's deliberation In response, the Court of Appeals stated "All inquiries into the thought 
processes of the jurors are improper because they undermine the integrity of the verdict. . . 
Because the affidavit contains information concerning the jury's deliberations, the trial court 
properly refused to consider it." Id at 3 (citing State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 248 n. 4 (Utah 
1992)). 
Based upon this analysis, together with deficiencies discussed later, the Court rejects the 
law clerk's affidavit. 
Next, the Court will address whether the trial court's admission of Officer Otte's 
testimony constituted a due process violation. 
As stated above, the defendant, in his Motion, relies almost exclusively on the Morrison 
decision. The Morrison decision, in turn, cites and relies upon Doyle in holding that "[i]t is error 
of a nature that should be obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the well-
established general rule prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-
Mnanda silence " Momson, 9^7 P 2d at 1296 Howe\ei, the defendant's leliance on Momson is 
misplaced m the instant case because the Utah Supieme Court has held that no Do}Ie violation 
has occuned when an officei meieh testifies about 'the cncumstances of the an est and the 
information elicited was but a part of the natuial sequence of e\ ents " State i hi ms, 609 P 2d 
1326, 1328 (Utah 1980) 
The U S Supieme Court held in Do\Ie v Ohio that the use for impeachment purposes of 
a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent \iolates the Due Piocess Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U S Constitution The Court latei explained in Gieei v Millet, 
483 U S 756 (1987), that the prosecution must make some "specific inquiry or argument" 
regaiding the defendant's post-Miranda silence foi a Do] k \ lolation to occur Gi eei, 483 U S at 
764 The Utah courts have lepeatedly constiued Doyle and Gieei to mean that a due process 
violation "involves more than simply referring to a defendant's post-Mnanda silence " State v 
Maas, 99\ P 2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App \999), State v Haimon, 956 P 2d 262 (Utah 1998) The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "the mere mention that a defendant invoked his constitutional 
rights does not prima facie establish a due piocess violation " State \ Hai mon, 956 P 2d 262, 
268 (Utah 1998) In Hai mon, the Supreme Court refused to find a Doyle \ lolation because the 
reference to the defendant's invocation of rights was elicited "merely incidentally" and the 
prosecutor made no further refeience to the defendant's silence or attempt to "persuade the jury 
to do so " Id at 269 In Maas, even though the arresting officer mentioned at trial that the 
defendant had invoked her Mu anda rights, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[t]he disclosure 
of Maas' invocation of rights was incidental to the description of Officer Neal's conversation 
with Maas" and found no Doyle violation Maas, 991 P 2d at 112 The Maas court follows Greer 
when it states "A prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a defendant's 
exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a defendant's exculpatory explanation of 
his conduct" Id 
Harmon and Maas are controlling in the instant case Officer Otte's statement revealing 
that the defendant had "pled the Fifth" came at the end of a long narration of events as he 
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answeimg questions (aftei his w ai\ ei), did nothing to piotest his innocence It is not implicit that 
the juror w as referring to the defendant's post-Miranda invocation silence In other w ords the 
juroi could just as easity ha\e been lefenmg to the defendant's choice of pre-imocation 
statements To argue that the \eidict would ha\e turned out diffeiently because of one juror's 
unclear statement of one leason why he 01 she \ oted to com ict is highly questionable The ]uior 
could ha\ e been refenmg to the fact that when the defendant was confionted outside the store 
about having jewelry items on his peison, he did not protest, but fiankty admitted taking the 
items The ambiguity of the affida\it is troubling and forms an independent basis for its rejection 
The State of Utah easily satisfies the second Reyes factor, "whethei there was 
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt " Id The case facts and the piosecutor's 
arguments centered on the fact that b> the time the defendant walked past the cash registers, he 
had already committed theft No leasonable person puts a cell phone in a leather case, a spell 
checkei m a pant's pocket and assorted jewelry m a separate pant's pocket prior to purchase and 
then leaves a store without any payment or attempted payment for any items Certainly, a jury 
may conclude on these facts that the defendant was guilty- without any argument or refeience 
whatsoever by the State that they should draw an mfeience of guilt from his silence The 
evidence of guilt was overwhelming 
The State also satisfies the third Reyes factor, "[w]hether the leference was isolated " It is 
difficult to imagine a more isolated refeience than one solitary comment by the officer as part of 
a long narration, without any subsequent argument or inquiry by the prosecution Momson, m 
contrast, had two entire lines of questioning concerning the defendant's silence, with clear 
indication from the prosecution as to what conclusion the jury should draw from his silence 
Momson at 1295-96 In stark contrast, the reference in this case is clearly and unquestionably 
isolated 
The Fourth Reyes factor, "whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any 
adverse presumption from the defendant's decision not to testify," Morrison at 1297, may have 
been satisfied by jury instruction 18 The defendant correctly states that the instruction does not 
answeied the piosecutoi s open-ended question "Did \ou ha\ e a com elation with the defendant 
at this point9' Officei Otte sa\s nothing about the defendant s imocation ot lights until the 
fourteenth line of his testimom, as printed in the tnal tianscnpt Neithei the piosecutoi nor 
Officei Otte makes mention 01 makes e\ en a \ ague ieference to the in\ ocation of lights at am 
other time dunng the tnal, eithei m examination or in aigument Theie was no * specific mquir) 
01 argument" legaidmg the Defendant's silence The lefeience was only "incidental" and was 
part ot Officei Otte s lecitation of the "natural sequence of e\ ents " 
Cleail) this case is distinguishable fiom Moi i ison, since in that case the piosecution 
focused an entire line of questioning on the defendant's "willingness to talk," using two different 
officei witnesses, and asserting m argument a theory about the defendant's intention in keeping 
silent, Moi i ison, 937 P 2d at 1295-96 Nothing akin to the Moi i ison scenano has occurred in this 
case 
Even if the tnal court's admission of Officei Otte's statement was en or, it did not ha\e a 
"substantial ad\erse effect upon the lights of a part)" sufficient to oidei a new tnal 
E\ en if Defendant weie conect in aiguing that the trial court ened in admitting Officei 
Otte's testimony, the error was harmless The purpose of the Re\es factois are to "guide" the 
court, and the State need not pie\ail on all foui factois to show harmlessness Moi i ison at 1296 
Theie is little question that with regard to the fust factor, the jury in this case "would 
'natuially and necessarily construe' the comment as lefernng to the defendant's silence " Id It is 
certainly unclear whether "knowing about Valdez's silence affected the jury \ eidict " Assuming, 
arguendo, that this Court were to admit the law clerk's affidavit, a thoiough reading of the 
affidavit shows that the juror was concerned about the defendant's failure to protest his 
innocence What is claimed is that the juror was concerned about the defendant's failure to 
protest his innocence What is not known is if the juror's concern arose from the defendant's pre-
waiver statements or his post-invocation silence This is not known because the defendant had, 
pnor to invoking Miranda, previously waived Miranda and willingly answered questions It is 
reasonable to infer that the juror was concerned that the defendant, while he was willingly 
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specifLalh icfei to 4 post an est silence ' but that is not an element that the Moi / isoi ox Re\ cs 
courts ha\e lequned or e\en anahzed The Court conclude^ that it is unJeai whethei instruction 
18 sufficienth mstiucts the jui\ that it should not make am piesumption 01 inference from the 
defendant's silence 
The Court has addressed and consideied all the Re] cs factois Ne\ ertheless it is the 
opinion of this Court that the facts of this case aie exceptionally unique 
The Coun notes that the Stated reference to the defendants silence v as isolated and w as 
elicited b\ a genenc question The onlj specific inquiry ielating to defendant's silence was 
elicited b) the defense not the piosecution (See tianscnpt at M 38) It is clear that the defense 
cannot invite enoi and then rely upon that enoi on appeal 01 foi anothei remed) It is unclear 
whethei the defense can enhance and mdependentl} le-emphasize the "silence en or" b} its own 
cioss examination howe\ er isolated and then continue to claim ' plain en or " Once the defense 
engages in cioss examination specifically lefeiencmg the silence of the defendant is the 
Momson/Re\es anal)sis even applicable9 Neithei the defense noi piosecution addresses this 
critical issue It has not been briefed and the Court is left to pondei Is the cuiatne mstiuction 
obligation waived7 Query Was it the prosecution, defense 01 neithei that ma> have cieated an 
inference of guilt in the jury's mind b> refeiencing the defendant's silence9 How can this Court 
diffeientiate9 
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IV 
Conclusion 
For the reasons cited above, the Court denies the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
The State of Utah is instmcted to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling. The clerk of the 
court is instructed to set this matter for sentencing forthwith. 
Dated this 
7& 
day of March, 2007 
BY THE COURT S^#it. 
INSTRUCTION NO !8 
A Defendant is not required to testify in Defendant's own behalf. The law expressly gives 
a Defendant the privilege of not testifying if that Defendant so desires. The fact that a Defendant has 
not taken the witness stand must not be taken as any indication of that Defendant's guilty, nor should 
you indulge in any presumption or inference adverse to the Defendant by reason thereof. The burden 
remains with the State, regardless of whether a Defendant testifies in Defendant's own behalf or not, 
to prove by the evidence such Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
DOuOu? 
